Mobile operators offer a wide range of valueadded services (VAS) to their subscribers (i.e., mobile users), which in turn generates around 15% of the telecommunication industry revenue. However, simultaneous VAS requests from a large number of mobile devices to a single server or a cluster in an internet-of-things (IoT) environment could result in an inefficient system, if these requests are handled one at a time as the present traditional cellular network scenario is. This will not only slow down the server's efficiency but also adversely impacts the performance of the network. The current (insecure) practice of transmitting user identity in plaintext also results in traceability. In this paper, we introduce the first known protocol designed to efficiently handle multiple VAS requests at one time, as well as ensuring the secure delivery of the services to a large number of requesting mobile users. The proposed batch verification protocol (BAS-VAS) is capable of authenticating multiple simultaneous requests received by a large number of mobile users. We demonstrate that the protocol preserves user privacy over the network. The provider's servers ensure the privacy of the requested service's priority by performing sorting over encrypted integer data. The simulation results also demonstrate that the proposed protocol is lightweight and efficient in terms of communication and computation overheads, protocol execution time, and batch and re-batch verification delay. Specifically, we perform batch and re-batch verification (after detecting and removing malicious requests from the batch) for multiple requests in order to improve the overall efficiency of the system, as well as discussing time, space and cost complexity analysis, along with the security proof of our protocol using Proverif.
I. INTRODUCTION
M OBILE computing and telecommunications industries are among the ones of the fastest growing industries worldwide. Mobile/cellular technologies, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE), are useful in environments where mobile users access Value-Added Services (VAS) through a Value-Added Service Provider (VASP). VAS are services offered by telecommunication operators to their subscribers for enabling direct, fast and easy access of information. As VAS are generally delivered over mobile devices, such services are also referred to as Mobile Value-Added Services (M-VAS). M-VAS are reportedly accessed by 75% of mobile subscribers at India in 2014 [1] . Popular VAS delivered via Short Message Service (SMS) include music and entertainment links and codes (e.g., voting for reality shows and contests), booking of match and movie tickets, location based services, mobile advertising, SMS chatting and dating services, mobile banking through SMS, sports news and current affairs, weather reports, promote retail sales, festival related notifications, government reach to its citizen through SMS, and retrieving of game scores) [2] . For the foreseeable future and in the world of Internet-of-Things (IoT ), M-VAS will have widespread applications. For example, M-VAS reportedly account for approximately 15% of telecommunication industry revenues [3] . The global M-VAS market is expected to increase to $655.07 billion by 2020 [4] , and M-VAS market size is set to exceed USD 1,300 billion by 2024 [5] . However, balancing between security and efficiency in the service delivery to a large number of mobile devices will be challenging. According to Lerner et al. from Solon Telecoms, UK [6] , among the VAS companies they have spoken with, most show strong continued organic growth in SMS-based revenues driven by growing penetration and ability to drive engagement. The cloud-based consumer VAS market revenue is estimated to be $48.4 billion in 2017 and is expected to reach $171.7 billion by 2023, growing at a CAGR of 23.5% during the forecast period 2017-2023. The SMS market revenue is estimated to reach $111.74 billion by 2023, growing at a CAGR of 21.5% during 2017-2023 [7] .
A. Problem Statement
Operators of different cellular networks, such as Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), and LTE, generally transmit data on the same channel as voice to optimize 1556-6013 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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resource utilization, and non-voice data normally takes the form of VAS through SMS [8] . However, in Jan. 2014, the Guardian newspaper and Channel 4 News reported that the NSA collects (lawfully) and stores almost 200 million text messages per day across the globe. NSA programmes code named "Dishfire" and "Prefer" extracted location information, contacts and financial data from SMS messages, including automated texts, such as roaming charge alerts [9] . Vesselin mentioned on Security Tokens [10] that people are aware that SMS-based authentication is insecure because of security flaws like Singling System 7 (SS7). ITU-T Q.3615, which is a telecommunication standardization sector of International Telecommunication Union (ITU), provides the communication of location information between various Location-Based Services (LBSs) over SMS [11] . ITU-T X Series provides standard and guidelines for data networks, open system communications and security [12] (last updated on 4 June 2019). But at present, telecom operators do not implement any security services to SMS due to overhead and cost. More specifically, ITU-T Rec. X.1146 identified the user identity authentication as a threat to VAS on single user account basis and does not discuss and support batch verification-based user authentication for VAS. According to a 2016 study [13] , the usage of SMS for different services has many security flaws. The researchers have analyzed 400,000 text messages and found a significant portion of these messages was sent with confidential and private information (like credit card numbers, CVV, PIN, password reset options, etc.) that can be accessed over the network, as the traditional SMS does not contain any security, nor any authentication process for broadcast/multicast services. Also, in some countries, mobile operators may require a separate license for M-VAS [3] . Mobile operators such as Vodafone and Airtel provide M-VAS to their customers, based on user's information and usage preference [14] , [15] . However, this may limit the design of suitable security protocols as well as affecting the performance of M-VAS delivery to a large number of mobile subscribers (in an IoT environment) and hence, user's quality of experience. For example, in the attempt to cater to wide ranging user information and usage preferences (e.g., handling multiple M-VAS requests at any one time) could result in significant overheads, lengthy execution and verification times, and a bottleneck. The performance challenge is compounded when invalid authentication requests are transmitted to the AS due to half-open connections by flood-based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and other cyber-attacks. Saxena et al. proposed an "EasySMS" protocol for end-toend secure transmission of SMS [16] , but the protocol only deals with one SMS at a time. The system's performance degrades due to large overhead as there is an increase in the number of mobile users' requests for authentication. The EasySMS protocol generates 18, 36 (1 time 100% increase), 216 (11 times increase), and 2016 (111 times increase) bytes as the computation overhead when the number of mobile users' requests are 1, 10, 100, and 1,000, respectively. Similarly, this protocol produces 2,152, 4,456 (1.07 times increase), 27,496 (11.77 times increase), and 257,896 (118.84 times increase) bytes as the communication overhead for the same number of users' authentication requests. Clearly, single authentication-based EasySMS generates too much overhead and has performance issue with a large number of mobile users' authentication requests. Thus, in this paper, we focus on the computational effort required by the VASP, seeking to minimize wherever practical. In a real-world deployment, the communication bandwidth between a user and the VASP may be limited (e.g., in rural areas with poor coverage). Therefore, we need to ensure the size of communicated messages to be as small as possible. In addition, services requested by a user should be un-linkable to each other, in order to ensure confidentiality of the user and VAS. The adversary may also target a specific user, based on the user's priorities for different services requested. For example, a user particularly in a sparsely populated area (e.g., a rural town) could be identified or profiled due to the user's priorities for requested services. Therefore, it is important to hide the priority of the service requested by each user from the Authentication Server (AS), Service Providing Server (SPS) and adversary.
B. Existing Solutions
A number of solutions have been presented in the literature that are designed to provide VAS in different networks, such as Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) [17] - [20] , publicprivate key based vehicular communication system [21] , [22] , privacy-preserving authentication and access control protocol in VANET [23] , and social networks [24] . However, there is no known solution for batch-oriented VAS services to mobile users in a mobile/cellular network. In addition, while existing solutions generally are secure against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, they do not provide integrity protection to the messages (with the exception in [20] ).
Zhang et al. [19] introduced a batch signature verification protocol IBV, based on identity-based cryptography, that can verify multiple received signatures at the same time. Zhang et al. [20] proposed a novel message authentication protocol named RAISE that adopts the k-anonymity property for preserving user privacy. They further proposed a supplementary protocol that can cooperatively work to probabilistically verify only a small percentage of these message signatures based on a device's computing capacity. Further, Huang et al. [18] introduced an anonymous batch authenticated and key agreement (ABAKA) protocol, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), to authenticate multiple requests sent from different vehicles and establish different session keys for different vehicles at the same time. Furthermore, Chim et al. [21] provided a software-based solution, SPECS, which uses bloom filter and trusted authority for key management and is based on pairing-based bilinear mapping. Zhang et al. [22] found that SPECS is vulnerable to impersonation attack and hence, proposed an improved version named b-SPECS+.
We also remark that IBV in [19] does not deliver mutual authentication and only partially defeats impersonation attacks. While user privacy is ensured in ABAKA [18] , RAISE [20] and PAACP [23] , the RAISE protocol generates a large overhead and has a large storage requirement, as it maintains an IDkey table. The PAACP protocol is based on asymmetric key cryptosystem that also generates a large overhead. It provides access control to vehicles in order to communicate with road side equipment. Unlike PAACP, different VAS provided by many mobile operators do not impose any access restrictions to the users, as all VAS are publicly available to each mobile subscriber. Hence, in such a setting, an access control protocol is not required. Both SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22] protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks. There are a small number of wireless SMS-based protocols [25] - [27] , but these protocols neither consider VAS nor handle multiple requests.
There are also a number of commercially available software such as SMSzipper, TextSecure, moGile Secure SMS, CryptoSMS that allow users to send secure SMS, but they are not suitable for M-VAS, as these software need to be regularly patched to avoid any disclosed vulnerabilities to be exploited. For example, TextSecure has already decided to remove the encryption function [28] , and the subscribers will have to tap connection data for encrypted SMS. In fact, the developers want to get rid of the security feature due to the performance degradation and secret key distribution issue. Hence, we cannot completely build our trust on these apps, as some of their features or the applications itself can shut down at any time. Similarly, for example, CryptoSMS does not support all types of mobile devices [29] . Therefore, it is preferable to develop an authentication protocol (rather than a software) that would provide a secure communication interface between the service providers and the end users.
It is also important to follow the best practices on mobile device security. AlDairi and Tawalbeh [30] , for example, demonstrated several potential security and privacy attacks on mobile platform, such as eavesdropping, denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, phishing, spoofing, data integrity, and identity theft. In order to defeat such attacks and achieve better awareness and security behavior understanding, Bitton et al. [31] introduced an expert-based procedure for deriving mobile security awareness models for different attack classes (each class is an aggregation of social engineering attacks that exploit a similar set of human vulnerabilities). Furthermore, Thompson et al. [32] evaluated data from 629 home computer and mobile device users to improve understanding of security behavior, and several factors particularly, the perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, response cost, descriptive norm and psychological ownership were tested against both types of device users. Only perceived severity was only found to play a role in mobile device security behavior.
Generally, a single authentication (non-batch) refers to the authentication between a single mobile user and an authentication server at any one time. The server will not process any request sent by other mobile user until the first user's verification is successfully processed. On the other hand, in a batch authentication process, if malicious user requests are present, the process will not successfully complete. This will require the detection of invalid mobile user requests, remove them from the existing batch, and thereafter perform the batch authentication process again, such a process is also referred to as re-batch authentication. Batch authentication slightly differs from a group authentication. Generally, a group is (much) smaller than a batch, and a group is created for a specific purpose and a goal, in the sense that it has special properties, and group members work together towards the defined goal. On the other hand, a batch is simply an involvement and participation of several users belonging to one or several groups. There are no defined members for mobile users under a batch. A mobile user from any specific group can participate in a batch authentication at any time. In fact, a batch can contain several groups and their associated members. As an example, several mobile users with differing purposes (e.g., dating-related services, e-ticketing services, and so on) can participate in this protocol (as long as the users interact with the same cellular service provider's authentication server) to secure their transmitted messages.
Though cellular-enabled data centers are the future, at present they have their own growing pains to overcome, and traditional SMS-based cellular systems are underway to implement this idea. As the prices of cellular data plans throughout the world continue to drop, the comparative cost of installing additional lines solely for the purpose of network fail over becomes more and more difficult to justify [33] . The 4G LTE infrastructure already includes authenticated and encrypted internal signaling, integrity protection, enterprise end-point routers, devices with built-in firewall, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneling with encryption for over the Internet connectivity. Data centers will be drawn to data plans featuring support for non-Internet-facing private 4G LTE carrier networks as their traffic will be segregated from the Internet. In addition to the regular authentication of the mobile users, the network has to authenticate users asking for a specific VAS. For this second part, verification requires efficient handling of the requests of mobile users, as each user may opt for several VAS and can request many times in a day. Hence, authentication with a traditional process will be too much time consuming and the generated overhead will be way more than the authentication in a batch. Hence, we designed the BAS-VAS protocol that can manage the overall generated overhead and time efficiency of the verified requests.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no batch verification-based protocol (multiple user requests verification simultaneously) in the literature, which provides M-VAS, although there are many authentication protocols for GSM network [34] - [36] , UMTS network [37]- [39] , and LTE network [40] , [41] . All these protocols are mainly used to achieve authentication, and do not execute authentication requests in a batch. Existing group authentication and key agreement protocols for LTE network [42] , [43] are also not designed to provide M-VAS or based on SMS. Hence, such protocols are excluded in the performance evaluation. Recently in 2015, a solution was proposed to ensure mobile user privacy [44] . The solution considers that new International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) must always be chosen by the home network to prevent assigning a single IMSI to two different Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and suggests predefined multiple IMSI for each USIM. However, this solution requires a large storage, generates significant overhead for pseudo-identities, and consumes significant bandwidth to transmit various IMSI to each Mobile Subscriber (MS).
C. Our Contributions
In this paper (based on a preliminary idea published in [45] ), we propose and present an efficient and secure batch oriented authentication and key agreement protocol, hereafter referred to as BAS-VAS, for providing VAS to mobile users. The protocol allows mobile users a fast and easy way of consuming VAS, as the protocol is based on symmetric key cryptography and performs symmetric key encryption (with the exception of sorting encrypted messages), which is 1,000 times faster than asymmetric key encryption [27] . Moreover, the AS is capable of authenticating multiple requests at a time, which improves the overall efficiency of the system. The BAS-VAS enables efficient execution of VAS request with a lower verification delay. It also provides confidentiality and integrity to the messages, and non-linkability to previously received VAS. We regard the contributions of this work to be three-fold:
• Our proposed BAS-VAS provides mutual authentications between each MS and the AS. The BAS-VAS maintains confidentiality using Advance Encryption Standard with Counter mode (AES-CTR) and integrity using Message Authentication Code (MAC) function between both, MS and AS. These security features were not available in the earlier protocol [45] . • We propose and demonstrate the usefulness of keeping the original identity of each MS secret during its transmission over the network in mitigating IMSI capturing and impersonation attacks. In this approach, we do not need to generate multiple IMSI at the AS or send multiple IMSI to the MS, unlike in [44] . Moreover, unlike the protocol in [45] , we use a standard AES-CTR to generate a Temporary Identity (TID) and an original IMSI. • As the proposed protocol hides the priority of the service requested by each user from other users and servers, we present a protocol to perform sorting over the encrypted priorities of different services. We then compare the performance of the proposed protocol with that of five protocols, namely: ABAKA, SPECS, b-SPECS+, IBV and RAISE. In a single/batch authentication, the BAS-VAS protocol achieves a reduction of 14.29% and 10% in transmission bandwidth from the device to the server, in comparison to both ABAKA and RAISE, respectively. However, transmission bandwidth of our protocol is only slightly larger than IBV [19] , but IBV does not deliver mutual authentication and only partially defeats impersonation attack. Our protocol also reduces the communication bandwidth consumption from the server to the device by 60%, in comparison to ABAKA and RAISE, while IBV does not transmit data from the server to the device. In addition, our protocol uses less bandwidth than SPECS and b-SPECS+ (35.23% and 69.42%, respectively).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the system and threat models, and the assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 present the proposed BAS-VAS protocol and its security analysis, respectively. The formal proof using Proverif is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 present the findings from the performance evaluation and simulation, respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes this work. 
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we present the system model (Section 2.1), threat model (Section 2.2), and system assumptions (Section 2.3).
A. System Model
We consider a scenario for VAS where multiple MS send authentication requests to a AS simultaneously (or in fixed short time duration). The challenge is for the AS to verify and authenticate the maximum number of MS it is capable of handling efficiently -see Figure 1 . Upon receiving the requests, AS will verify and send information of authenticated MS to the server responsible for the requested VAS. Thereafter, the SPS provides the service to all legitimate MS. These authentication requests may be single or multiple to a AS. However, in practice, it is unlikely to have only a single request at any one time. If the server is only capable of handling one request at a time, then a queue is required to manage all incoming requests. This will results in the additional task (i.e., queue management, resulting in increased overheads, execution time, and costs of authentication). To scale well, the AS needs to be very efficient in handling a large number of requests sent in a burst (very short period of time).
One way to more efficiently handle multiple authentication requests simultaneously is to perform batch authentication for all incoming requests, and identify and remove invalid request (e.g., generated by an adversary) prior to performing a re-batch authentication. While there are additional costs associated with the re-batch authentication, it can significantly reduce the overall authentication costs. We further extend our scenario in such a way where each MS can send its request with a priority ranging from 1 to 5 (1-least and 5-most important). This will allow the SPS to provide the required service according to the user's need (e.g., user pays a premium to have the service delivered faster). The notations used in the remainder of this paper are presented in Table I . 
B. Threat Model
In the ideal model, all mobile users compute the required functions in a probabilistic polynomial time, since the trusted AS is linked to all mobile users via a perfect private and authenticated channel. All mobile users are also honest. In the realistic model, we consider a mix of mobile users, namely: honest majority, semi-honest majority and no-honest majority. The honest majority means that honest MS (legitimate to the network) and AS send correctly formed outputs to each other (i.e., majority of the requests are legitimate), whereas for semi-honest, no more than half the MS send incorrectly formed outputs to the AS (i.e., at least half of the requests are legitimate). In the no-honest MS (malicious MS to the network) scenario, more than half the MS send incorrectly formed outputs to the AS (i.e., at most half of the requests are legitimate). Furthermore, malicious MS computes the required function in a probabilistic polynomial time with some arbitrary information. We do not consider these scenarios for the AS, as malicious AS does not have the correct keys in its database. Therefore, we consider only the trusted AS scenario, where the AS always sends correct outputs to all MS. All messages are sent from the MS to the AS (and vice versa) in time via an authenticated channel under the ideal model, while an adversary can choose to delay some, or all, messages under an unauthenticated channel in the realistic model. We assume that an authenticated channel provides end-to-end security to the transmitted message, and hence, there is no need for additional message encryption. i) Adversary: Our threat model consists of a static (nonadaptive) and an adaptive adversary. In the static adversary threat model, the set of corrupted users are fixed. In the adaptive model, the adversary can corrupt any (number of) user(s) at will during run time. Furthermore, adversary can choose any input/output for the corrupted users. We also consider passive and active adversaries in the network.
ii) Security Attacks, and Integrity and Privacy Violations:
The authentication protocol must provide mutual authentication [36] , [39] , where each MS must authenticate the AS to which it is requesting for a VAS and also the AS must verify the MS. Unidirectional authentication may lead to eavesdropping, redirection and impersonation attacks [39] , [43] . Also, the halfopen connection requests can be vulnerable to flood-based DoS attacks. In addition, the protocol needs to handle key generation, transmission and its usage. Specifically, the session key must not be sent over the network in plaintext. The original identity of each MS must also be protected during its transmission over the network. Such privacy preservation helps to prevent the system against MITM attacks [39] , [44] . If IMSI is sent in cleartext, an adversary can target the system/user by tracing the user. Software such as IMSI catcher can be used to capture IMSI of a user over a weak or unencrypted network. Furthermore, data confidentiality and message integrity should be maintained in order to enhance the resilience of the system against common attacks [39] . Also, an adversary must not be able to link current session authentication information (e.g., messages and keys) with previous sessions (i.e., nonlinkability), in addition to ensuring forward/backward secrecy.
C. System Assumptions
Traditional mobile system is generally implemented using symmetric key cryptosystem; thus, we choose a symmetric key cryptosystem with a lightweight protocol so that it is backward compatible (i.e., can run on older mobile devices). However, we can add new features and services using any cryptographic primitives. We then use Paillier homomorphic encryption to implement sorting over encrypted integer data, which is not possible using symmetric homomorphic encryption in the considered scenario. Specifically, we consider the following system assumptions:
Assumption 1: each MS has a unique identity as IMSI [36] . Assumption 2: Authentication Center (AuC) is part of the AS; hence, AS ⊂ Home Location Register (HLR). In LTE, the HSS (Home Subscriber Server) is the concatenation of the HLR and the AuC. The encryption at the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) works in the same way as in a traditional mobile network. The AuC sends a session key of a user to the BTS via secure channel [35] , [37] . The HLR and AuC store information about a mobile subscriber. This information includes the IMSI, phone number, private key, and current location of the mobile user for packet and circuit switched operations.
Assumption 3: A secret key SK is stored in the AuC's database as well as on the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) of the MS at the time of manufacture, similar to a traditional mobile network [35] , [37] .
Assumption 4: The AS is a legitimate server, which does not disclose or send stored secret keys of one user to others without authorization, similar to a traditional mobile network [41] .
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL: BAS-VAS
In this section, we present the proposed novel lightweight, efficient and secure batch-oriented protocol, BAS-VAS, for delivering VAS in a secure and timely manner (see Figure 3). BAS-VAS provides batch-oriented mutual authentication between the AS and all MS. The protocol also maintains message integrity between each MS and the AS using MAC, which is an improvement of the protocol previously published in [45] . Let m be the total number of authentication requests generated by the mobile users MS i (where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , m) and these requests are sent to the AS at the same time or in a burst. The value of m actually depends upon the capacity of the authentication server, which can then be publicly announced or privately communicated to each mobile subscriber as control information. The protocol comprises user registration, pseudo-identity creation, protocol initialization and protocol execution.
A. User Registration
Upon a user's request, the operator activates the SIM card by establishing a connection between the SIM card and the AS. The AS generates a random one-time code as Actcode, and stores Actcode in its database as a label to the secret key SK, prior to sending Actcode to the SIM card. The SIM card then receives and stores Actcode in the memory, as shown in Figure 2 . When an MS requests for VAS, Actcode is sent from the MS to the AS. This allows the AS to retrieve the requesting user's SK key from the database without actually knowing the original user identity, i.e., IMSI, rather just by receiving the TID, as shown in Figure 3 , the AS side computations.
B. Pseudo-Identity Creation
The generation of TID and retrieval of IMSI are not publicly available. We also introduce an encryption function to generate a temporary identity, where each MS i generates a delegation key DK i = f 1 (T i ) SK i derived from the shared secret key SK i . Here, T i is the current timestamp, and f 1 () a oneway hash-based MAC function (e.g., HMACSHA256 [46] ). If the system is not synchronized or the use of timestamp is not practical, we can use a nonce (a random number) in place of timestamp value. Thereafter, each MS i computes TID i = f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DK i to avoid the need to transmit the original IMSI i over the network, as shown in Figure 3 . This is designed to reduce the risk of ID-theft, eavesdropping and MITM attacks. We remark that the f 2 () function is just like any reversible symmetric encryption function, such as AES with counter mode (AES-CTR). The structure of this function may be known, but DK i remains secret. This is another improvement over the protocol in [45] , as in the latter, f 2 () was used as a non-standard function.
C. Protocol Initialization
Initially, each MS chooses a random number k i ∈ Z * p , generates the current timestamp T i and a delegation key DK i , where Z p is a cyclic group of integers modulo p. In fact, this DK i is generated at both, the MS i and the AS using a shared secret key SK i stored at the AS and on the SIM card at the time of manufacture. Thereafter, each MS i computes X i = k i ⊕ IMSI i and a token value S i = (k i + DK i ⊕ G) mod m, where + is an addition and ⊕ is a bitwise-XOR operation. We refer to this token value a symmetric-signature. Here, each mobile user generates a valid symmetric-signature and fulfills the security properties with Assumption 4, namely: authenticity (signer signs associated message with its key), unforgeability (only signer can generate valid symmetricsignature for the associated message, while assuming AS a trusted entity), non-reusability (generated symmetric-signature cannot be used more than once), non-repudiation (signer cannot deny signing a previous message, i.e., symmetric-signature with an assumption of the AS as a trusted entity), and integrity (ensures that contents have not been modified). In a symmetric key protocol, both parties (say, parties A and B) know the shared secret key. Hence, it would be challenging for a thirdparty receiving a message to determine whether the message was sent by party A or party B. Therefore, in our context, only the two parties are involved and send messages to each other, since only both MS i and AS know the corresponding secret key SK i and the generated DK i key.
When a message is sent from the MS i to the AS with a token value (symmetric-signature) S i , the AS knows that the used DK i can only be generated by the corresponding MS i (which can also be determined by verifying IMSI i from the received TID i ). Therefore, it is clear to the AS that the received message was actually sent by the corresponding MS i . Similarly, this applies for the MS i receiving a message from the AS. In addition, since the generated DK i is not transmitted over the network, the adversary A is unable to compromise DK i . One possible way is to provide non-forgeability and nonrepudiation using asymmetric key cryptography, where each party sends an encrypted message signed using the sender's private key. On the other hand, the receiver verifies the digital signature using the sender's public key. Since BAS-VAS deals with only symmetric key cryptography, signatures generated by asymmetric keys are not performed. In the presented scenario, the adversary A cannot generate valid symmetricsignature, as it does not know the SK i key and is unable to generate the DK i key. Moreover, the MS i and the AS are able to determine the sender of the message. Therefore, the process fulfills the required security properties.
D. Protocol Execution
Step 1: Each MS i sends an authentication request,
hash-based MAC function, and the key used is DK i . On receiving the authentication requests, the AS first computes MAC1 i and compares MAC1 i ? = MAC1 i . If the verification is successful, then the AS retrieves SK i from the respective Actcode i , and then computes DK i and
= R) at the AS, all MS i are successfully verified by the AS. Otherwise, this implies one or more MS i are malicious, which then requires a re-batch authentication.
Re-Batch Authentication Process: In a re-batch authentication process, the AS first finds all invalid MS i with the help of an algorithm in [45] , [47] . Thereafter, the AS removes invalid MS i from the batch and again computes P
where t is the total number of invalid MS i . The AS then compares 
log 2 m times. At the end, this algorithm has a set of total number of invalid requests from MS i and these invalid requests must be removed from the batch before a re-batch authentication takes place. Each invalid MS i is placed in the black list of MS i and can only be removed after a predefined time. During this period the request from particular MS i is discarded.
Step 2: The AS sends all P i to the respective MS i along with MAC2 i and E(Actcode = P i , where P i = (DK i ⊕ IMSI i ). If the verification is successful, all MS i verify the AS. Otherwise, the particular MS i terminates the connection and initiates a fresh request to the AS. Subsequent Authentication Request: Any subsequent request initiated by respective MS i within the expiry time of DK i is treated as a session request as shown in Figure 4 and is handled as follows:
Some of the computations (DK i , X i , S i ) are stored at the MS i as well as at the AS until the expiry time of DK i . Thus, if an MS i requests for an authentication within the expiry time, then (DK i , X i , S i ) do not change at the MS i . Instead, only a new TID i is generated by the new T i and IMSI i . Each MS i sends TID i , T i and Actcode i to the AS. Similarly, at the AS, only IMSI i is extracted from the received TID i and T i , after retrieving DK i using Actcode i . In such a scenario, DK i remains the same within the session time. If the AS finds a valid MS i session active, the AS sends E(Actcode i ) DK i to the respective MS i and asks the SPS to start delivering service to the corresponding MS i .
Reliability of the protocol can be understood as follows [18] , [45] , [47] . In this protocol, if all MS i are successfully verified then this protocol achieves its maximum reliability with respect to its performance. In such a case, this batch authentication protocol provides maximum successful authentications between the AS and MS i at one time and generates minimum verification delay. Let N M S be the maximum number of authentication requests generated at one point of time. Out of these requests, few can be invalid authentication requests, denoted as N I N . Since, N M S can be a very large number based on the type of value added service, the AS may not authenticate all the requests at one time due to its capacity. We assume that N AS is the maximum capacity of the AS to authenticate the requests at one time. Let Prob{t} be the probability that exactly t invalid authentication requests are sent to the AS. Then, the probability of the Hypergeometric distribution is as follows:
This indicates that (N ASt) valid requests are sent from (N M S -N I N ). One or more invalid request(s) in a batch leads to batch verification failure and in such cases re-batch verification is required.
Impact of Mobility When a User Moves Out of Range of the AS:
We also assume that various AS are installed and deployed at different geographic locations and are interconnected to each other with a pre-shared secret key between each pair of the AS. The AS where the user is registered is referred to as Home-AS, and all other AS deployed in roaming areas are Visiting-AS. When a mobile user requests for VAS in a roaming area, the corresponding Visiting-AS handles the request and sends the request message encrypted with a pre-shared secret key to the Home-AS of the user. The protocol execution takes place at the Home-AS and the result is securely provided to the Visiting-AS. Thereafter, the roaming Visiting-AS grants or revokes VAS to the user.
Distributing Different VAS to Respective SPS in Priority of User's Need: The AS authenticates all requests in a batch, irrespective of the type of service requested (ticket booking, news alerts, etc.). After successful authentication of the mobile users, the AS distributes the users' VAS requests and their encrypted priorities of the services to the respective SPS.
While this scenario is not a part of the authentication protocol, it provides a new feature of sorting encrypted integer priorities to ensure that the priority of the service requested by each user is not revealed to either AS or SPS. In such a case, we consider a public/secret keypair-based bilinear system for the SPS. Each MS i encrypts a Priority Message (E P K S P S {PM i }) using a public key of the SPS and sends the encrypted message to the AS. After authenticating all MS i , the AS aggregates all requests grouped by different VAS and sends a list of TID i and encrypted messages (discussed later) to the respective SPS, as shown in Figure 5 . Upon receiving a list, each SPS performs sorting over the encrypted PM i , arranges them in priority order as per users' need and notifies the AS that tells each user (by mapping TID i with IMSI i ) about the waiting time of the requested service to be served. Subsequently, each SPS provides its services to different users based on their order in the sorted list.
We use a Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme for this task, with an integer N = p × q, where p and q are large primes [48] . Homomorphic encryption, denoted by [.] , is used to encrypt the data represented by integers. A plaintext and a ciphertext are computed with modulo N and modulo N 2 . We use additive homomorphic encryption for two integers x and y, where [x].
[y] = [x + y] mod N 2 . The multiplicative inverse of x modulo N 2 is denoted by an integer y = x −1 , where 0 ≤ y < N 2 such that x y = 1 mod N 2 and can also be used to negate an encrypted integer:
We use a homomorphic encryption scheme [49] to perform additive operations in the following algorithms:
(a) Key generation: This algorithm generates the public keys and global parameters, given a security parameter. Let us consider two primes p and q, and N = p × q. Choose a generator of the group g ∈ Z * N 2 . Let λ(N) = lcm( p − 1, q − 1), where lcm represents least common multiple, and the public and secret keys of the receiver are PK = (N, g) and SK = (λ(N) ), respectively.
(b) Encryption: The sender chooses message M ∈ Z N and a random number r ∈ Z * N 2 . Thereafter, the sender computes the ciphertext using:
where r N is used to generate different ciphertexts, even when the same message is encrypted twice. (c) Decryption: In order to decrypt message C, the receiver computes:
where the function L takes an input from a set {u < N 2 |u = 1 mod N} and computes L(u) = (u − 1)/N. In additive homomorphism, the sender computes two ciphertexts C 1 = E(M 1 ) and C 2 = E(M 2 ) from M 1 , M 2 ∈ Z N , and the receiver decrypts 
The steps of this process repeated for each pair of encrypted priority messages are as follows:
1) Upon receiving the encrypted priority messages from different MS i , the AS chooses a random number r of log 2 N − 1 bits, encrypts r using PK key of the and PM 2 (i.e., z mod d) and observes the output. The output bit t = 1 for PM 1 iff {z mod d < r mod d}, and 0 otherwise. We repeat the process for all unordered pairs of encrypted priority messages using Timsort [50] . This sorting algorithm takes advantages of partial orderings that exist in most realworld data. Baldimtsi et al. used Batcher sort, which sorts a set of n-elements using O(n (log n) 2 ) data independent calls to a comparator function (i.e., number of rounds is the same for a fixed n), where O((log n) 2 ) are consecutive levels and O(n) are pairs of elements compared and swapped at each level [51] . On the other hand, Timsort has O(n) best case complexity, and O(n log n) average and worst case performance.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides the security analysis of BAS-VAS based on various security aspects, such as prevention against security attacks, attempts to retrieve secret and delegation keys over the network, at the AS and at the MS, attempts to capture IMSI of the users, forward/backward secrecy, indistinguishability, and fairness and correctness of the protocol.
Property 1: The proposed protocol defeats MITM, replay, redirection, flood-based DoS and impersonation attacks between the MS i and the AS. Furthermore, the adversary A is not able to compromise the security of the message by delaying the message.
BAS-VAS provides mutual authentication between the AS and the MS i . Specifically, the AS authenticates the MS i by checking ( m i=1 X i ) ? = R, and each MS i authenticates the AS by comparing P i ? = P i . Each MS i receives P i = DK i ⊕ IMSI i from the AS and computes its P i = DK i ⊕ IMSI i . If any of the MS i or AS does not verify successfully, then the respective user terminates the connection. This process prevents our system against redirection and impersonation attacks, and also resolves flood-based DoS attack by performing re-batch verification. Furthermore, f 2 () is implemented as AES-CTR that hides the user's identity and encrypts the activation code each time the user requests for another VAS. Therefore, it helps to protect the system against MITM attacks, as A cannot capture IMSI using IMSI catcher. Furthermore, the timestamp (or nonce) values sent along with each message protect the system against replay attacks. Moreover, integrity protection of each transmitted message (message content and its threshold delivery in time, T receive ≤ T generate +T threshold ) is maintained using MAC that prevents message tampering.
Property 2: Adversary A is unable to extract SK i and DK i keys over the network, at the MS i , and at the AS. A will not not be able to successfully retrieve the SK i or DK i key, even if it captures Actcode i of a mobile user sent over the network.
A unique DK i key is used within a session for each authentication between the AS and each MS i . Each DK i is generated from a SK i key and is stored at the AuC and on the SIM card at the time of manufacture. Since a random Actcode i is sent over the network each time the MS i requests for a VAS, the protocol is secure even if A is able to capture Actcode i . Note that A cannot retrieve the SK i and DK i keys, as they are never sent over the network. Moreover, if A retrieves some Actcode i , it cannot derive any relation among them, as these Actcode i are randomly generated. Moreover, each Actcode i is sent exactly once in plaintext over the network from the MS i to the AS. The AS always generates a random Actcode i and sends to each MS i as a ciphertext. Furthermore, if A modifies the encrypted Actcode i in message-2 from the AS, computed MAC2 i will not match with the received MAC2 i at the MS i . Also, the message will not decrypt correctly using a modified or fabricated DK i of the MS i . Hence, the MS i terminates the connection.
Property 3: Adversary A cannot trace the original identity of the MS i . In fact, A will also be unsuccessful in identifying the actual user, even if it captures the TID i of a mobile user.
Definition 1 (Untraceability): Our protocol satisfies untraceability, as A cannot distinguish whether two TID correspond to the same MS or two different MS.
Definition 2 (IND-ANO: Indistinguishability Under Anonymous Identity): Our protocol is IND-ANO, as no adversary A at time t can distinguish between two chosen identities TID 1 and TID 2 with a negligible advantage.
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In our protocol, privacy of each MS i is well protected. The TID i is computed from original IMSI i as TID i = f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DK i . We implement f 2 () as AES-CTR with DK i key, which is secure as no practical full attack has been found on AES at the time of this research. Furthermore, for all VAS requests including subsequent requests, a different TID i is generated each time when a user connects to the AS. The AS flushes out TID i from its memory, once a protocol run is completed. Hence, untraceability and identity anonymity are maintained, as A cannot trace TID i to link with users and also IMSI i cannot be revealed to A and intermediate operators.
Property 4: Adversary A cannot link current session information with the previous sessions. Moreover, our protocol maintains perfect forward/backward secrecy and chosen plaintext attack indistinguishability (IND-CPA) [52] .
For each fresh VAS request, the MS i and the AS generate a fresh DK i key with a unique timestamp, temporary identity of the user, Actcode i and k i . Therefore, A cannot retrieve any information based on linkability among various VAS requests.
Definition 3: Our protocol maintains backward and forward secrecy, as no A could discover previously used session keys or generate future keys. A only wins if its output bit b is equal to the random bit b in query and has a negligible advantage.
The SK i and DK i keys are never sent over the network. The DK i is used to encrypt IMSI i and Actcode i using AES-CTR. Even compromising current DK i will not allow A to generate past or future keys. Also, the past keys cannot be used for future sessions as both ends generate a new DK i key.
Definition 4 (IND-CPA: Indistinguishability Under Chosen Plaintext Attack:) Our protocol is IND-CPA secure, as no adversary A in time t can distinguish between two chosen messages msg 1 and msg 2 , and has no or negligible advantage.
We assume that A has unlimited access to the encrypted data using a random oracle. In our protocol, the messages encrypted by the same key generate different ciphertext as at least one of the input parameters is always different. The MS i generates TID i as f 2 (IMSI i , T i ) DK i , where T i changes each fresh message. Furthermore, the AS generates a fresh Actcode i for each new session and passes Actcode i to the respective MS i as E(Actcode i ) DK i . Note, each fresh Actcode i is encrypted and sent over the network only once. We use AES-CTR as f 2 () that encrypts successive values of a counter with AES, and regurgitates concatenation of the encrypted blocks. AES-CTR stream never includes twice the same block and is IND-CPA.
Property 5: The proposed protocol works well under both passive and active corruption attacks in the presence of static and adaptive adversaries A. The protocol achieves fairness and guaranteed output delivery with "no MS i (malicious or legitimate) having an advantage". The protocol main-tains correctness under honest, semi-honest and no-honest majority scenarios.
Passive corruption attack means that A obtains the complete information held by the corrupted MS i ; however, the MS i still runs the protocol correctly. On the other hand, active corruption attack refers that A takes full control of corrupted MS i . In both cases, our protocol works correctly, as it maintains IND-CPA indistinguishability as well as perfect forward/backward secrecy. Moreover, keys are never sent over the network and new delegation keys are generated for each session. Furthermore, both passive and active adversaries may be static (a set of corrupted MS i is chosen before the protocol starts), or adaptive (A can choose any corrupted MS i at any time during the run of the protocol). In any case, A's selection of corrupted MS i does not affect our protocol.
A protocol is said to be fair if it ensures that no user can gain a significant advantage over other users, even if the protocol halts for any reason. Consider a scenario in which MS 1 and MS 2 communicate with the AS at the same time. If all the MS 1 , MS 2 and AS are trusted, then the MS 1 /MS 2 and the AS can learn each others information. However, the MS 1 cannot learn anything about MS 2 's information and vice versa, as one user cannot obtain any other user's DK i key. Also, the user cannot derive IMSI i and signature S i of any other user, as DK i is secret and k i is randomly generated by the MS i . Our protocol maintains IND-CPA; therefore, no MS i has an advantage over others.
Our protocol works correctly under all three scenarios. We consider these scenarios at the MS i only, whereas the AS is considered as a trusted server similar to the server in the traditional cellular network. This is because the AS keeps SK i of all MS i secret; therefore, it cannot be dishonest or semi-dishonest. The effectiveness of our protocol under all three scenarios can be observed using re-batch verification delay. Under these scenarios, our protocol maintains security properties, such as IND-CPA, forward/backward secrecy and fairness.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed protocol, in terms of transmission and computation overheads, execution time, and batch and re-batch verification times.
A. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is defined as the total number of bits transmitted during the authentication over the network. Although in the literature we did not find any protocol that is directly related to our work (designed for batch verification and delivering of VAS), we compare the communication overhead of BAS-VAS with those of ABAKA [18] , SPECS [21] , b-SPECS+ [22] , IBV [19] and RAISE [20] . This is because these protocols support mutual authentications while keeping the same flow of information. However, the verification delays differ between VANET protocols and mobile network protocols, such as BAS-VAS, because VANET networks have additional devices and road side equipment used to communicate within the network. We also discuss the transmission overhead during the single and batch authentication requests. Table II , m = 1 in batch authentication denotes a single authentication process, and m is the maximum number of authentication requests generated by different mobile users at any one time. In BAS-VAS, the device is a mobile user and the server is an authentication server. It can be clearly observed that compared with ABAKA [18] and RAISE [19] , BAS-VAS has a lower transmission overhead (i.e., 72 and 32 bytes from the MS i to the AS and the AS to the MS i , respectively). However, this overhead is slightly larger, in comparison to IBV [19] . However, IBV does not transmit data from the server to the device. Moreover, BAS-VAS is more efficient than both SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22] , as it generates only 114 bytes of communication overhead, whereas SPECS [21] and b-SPECS+ [22] generate 176 and 288 bytes, respectively.
2) Batch Authentication: Multiple requests (m = 2, 3, . . . , i ) can be handled simultaneously by a batch verification process. We compare our protocol with other discussed protocols for a single (m = 1 ) as well as batch (m = 50 , 100, 200, 500 and 1,000) authentications. In batch/single authentications from the device to the server, BAS-VAS achieves a 14.29% and 10% reduction in transmission bandwidth, in comparison to the ABAKA and RAISE protocols, respectively. Similarly, from the server to the device batch/single authentications, BAS-VAS reduces the bandwidth consumption by 60%, in comparison to the ABAKA and RAISE protocols, respectively. Moreover, SPECS and b-SPECS+ use additional 35.23% and 60.42% of the bandwidth consumption as compared to BAS-VAS.
To show the practicability of the proposed protocol, we have compared the generated communication overhead of BAS-VAS with the EasySMS protocol [16] 
B. Computation Overhead
This section analyzes the computation overhead of BAS-VAS during a single as well as batch authentications.
1) Single MS i Authentication With Active Session:
The computed overheads at the MS i and the AS are as follows:
At
At AS:
2) Batch MS i Authentication With Active Session (i = 2, . . . , m): The computed overheads at the MS i and the AS are as follows:
The total computation overhead for a single authentication includes 4 Enc/Dec functions, 2 key generation functions, 6 XOR, 4 MACs, 1 Addition and 1 Subtraction operations. Similarly, the total computation overhead for a batch authentication includes 4m Enc/Dec functions, 2m key generation functions, (5m + 1) XOR, 4m MACs, (4m-3) Addition and m Subtraction operations. One can observe that in the proposed protocol as well as the EasySMS protocol, the computation overhead is theoretically the same, i.e., 18 bytes, when m (single authentication) = 1. The communication overhead generated by the proposed protocol is 104 bytes for single authentication, whereas the EasySMS protocol generates 2,152 bytes. Clearly, the BAS-VAS protocol is more communication efficient than EasySMS.
VI. SIMULATION FINDINGS
This section presents the simulation results of BAS-VAS in Java. We compute and evaluate the total execution time (Section VI.1), the batch verification time (Section VI.2) and the re-batch verification time (Section VI.3) of our protocol. We also present the time, space and cost complexity analysis of BAS-VAS.
A. Protocol Execution Time
This section describes the total execution time of the BAS-VAS protocol. We consider a client-server paradigm for the MS i and the AS, the simulations are conducted on an Intel Core i3-2330M 2.20GHz machine with Windows7 and 256 MB RAM using J2ME with mobile emulator and JDK1.7. We simulate our protocol with 50 MS and a single AS. We consider the average value of 30 iterations for each result. On average, the execution time to perform addition (T add ), XOR (T xor ) and subtraction (T sub ) are 0.000933 milliseconds (ms), 0.030322 ms and 0.000933 ms, respectively. On average, the server connection establishment time is 3,383 ms, transmission time for message (T i , X i , S i , TID i , MAC1 i , Actcode i ) and message (P i , M AC2 i , E(Actcode i ) DK i ) are 8.35 ms and 9.49 ms, respectively. Table III and Table IV present Furthermore, we implement f 2 () as AES-CTR with 128 bits DK i key passing input as IMSI i /TID i and T i and receiving output of 128 bits [53] . We also implement AES-CTR for Actcode i encryption with input of 64 bits as Actcode i concatenated with 64 bits FFFFFFFF. Table III presents the findings obtained for f 2 () and Actcode. The encryption (generation of TID i ) took 13.6 ms and decryption (generation of IMSI i ) executed 4.2 ms for f 2 (), while it took 12.8 ms and 4.1 ms, respectively, for the encryption and decryption of Actcode i . The f 1 () and f 3 () are implemented as HMACSHA256 and HMACSHA1, respectively. Table IV presents The single authentication process takes 4.5 s, and takes 45 s, 451 s, and 4,519 s, respectively, when 10, 100, and 1,000 mobile users are involved in the process. Overall, on average 4.5 s computation time will be required by each mobile user, which is reasonably good as the mobile phones can easily tolerate and perform this computation and handle the execution time. Hence, this overhead does not have any advert performance impact on real mobile phones and applications.
B. Verification Time
This section presents the verification time in the single and batch authentication requests. Here, verification time for an MS i is the time between the sent message (T i , X i , S i , TID i , MAC1 i , Actcode i ) and received response message (P i , MAC2 i , E(Actcode i ) DK i ). The verification time computed by the AS is the time between the sent messages (P i , MAC2 i , E(Actcode i ) DK i ) and the protocol completion.
Verification time in a batch authentication:
For AS: 185×m + 0.030322 × m + 4.1 × m = 189.13 × m ms.
Verification time in a single authentication: Consider m = 1 in the above verification time.
C. Re-Batch Verification Time
If a batch authentication is not successful, then it is expected to execute a re-batch authentication without including the invalid MS i . After detecting the invalid MS i , we remove them from the batch and execute a re-batch authentication.
Total verification time in a re-batch authentication = 0.031255 + 0.002799 × (m − t) ms = 0.000031 + 0.000002 × (m − t) sec. This time is sufficiently small to be considered negligible. In the scenario of an IoT environment where m = 100,000, the total execution time of all MS in a batch authentication is 4,51,959,000.02 ms. In other words, on average 4.519 s execution time will be required by each mobile user. Similarly, total verification times for MS and AS will be 0.568 s and 0.189 s (in total, 0.75 s), respectively, when m = 100,000. Total re-batch verification times when m = 100,000 will be 0.20 s (t = 1), 0.199 s (t = 499), 0.199 s (t = 501), 0.198 s (t = 999), and 0.000033 s (t = 99,999). Note that even m = 100,000, there is no observed adverse impact on the performance of the proposed protocol. In fact, the computed results remain consistent (changes were observed only in the decimal values). Thus, increasing the number of mobile users will not increase the protocol overhead and execution time. Hence, BAS-VAS supports scalability and efficiency, with adequate security.
D. Time, Space and Cost Complexity Analysis
In a single and batch authentication processes, we implement two functions f 1 () and f 3 () as HMAC functions, and Actcode and f 2 () as AES-CTR. The outputs of HMACSHA1 and HMACSHA256 are 160 bits and 256 bits, respectively. The DK i key needs 128 bits from 160 bits and MAC requires 64 bits out of 256 bits. In total, 192 bits are stored. The time complexity for addition, subtraction and XOR operations are constant (i.e., O(1)). For a single authentication (8 operations) and a batch authentication (9×m − 1 operations), their cost are O(1). The block cipher algorithm (e.g., AES) works with a fixed input size and has O(1) constant complexity. However, when the algorithm has a variable length input (say |m|), the time is O(m). For f 2 () and Actcode encryption in our protocol, the block size is fixed (128 bits) in AES-CTR (with random Initialization Vector (IV )). Therefore, the time complexity is independent of input and is constant O(1). Hence, in a single authentication (2 operations) and a batch authentication (2×m operations), the costs are O(1) for f 2 () and Actcode encryption/ decryption. The 128 bits of IMSI i and TID i also need to be stored. Furthermore, storage for HMACSHA1, HMACSHA256, and AES-CTR at the MS i and the AS are required. For a re-batch verification, O(1) is only the extra cost need to be paid (for 3m − 3t + 2 operations). Therefore, BAS-VAS is an efficient, secure and cost effective protocol that requires less storage.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The increasingly popularity of mobile devices and delivering VAS over mobile devices is a trend that is unlikely to go away any time soon. In this paper, we proposed a batch-oriented authentication and key agreement protocol that provides mutual authentication between each mobile user and the authentication server. The mutual authentication ensures the secure delivery of VAS to a legitimate requesting mobile user. Specifically, it efficiently verifies multiple requests sent by different MS at any one time while ensuring the original IMSI is kept private during the authentication as well as ensuring on-time delivery of VAS. Our protocol is also more efficient than the protocol in [44] in terms of preserving user privacy over the network. To the best of our knowledge, BAS-VAS is the first batch-oriented authentication protocol that provides VAS to mobile users. The protocol is designed on symmetric key cryptography, with the exception of our Paillier homomorphic encryption-based scheme. The latter scheme sorts encrypted integer data to maintain the privacy of the priorities of the requested services.
In both batch/single authentications from the device to the server, BAS-VAS achieves a significant reduction in transmission bandwidth by 14.29% and 10% respectively, in comparison to the ABAKA and RAISE protocols. From the server to the device in both batch/single authentications, the proposed protocol requires a lower (60%) communication bandwidth than the ABAKA and RAISE protocols. Moreover, our protocol is more efficient than SPECS and b-SPECS+ by 35.23% and 60.42%, respectively. Findings from our Java simulations of the protocol indicated that the estimated re-batch verification time to be almost negligible, and in the worst case scenario, the re-batch verification time is 2.8 ms when one out of 1,000 requests is invalid (i.e., 999 requests will need to be executed in a re-batch). The findings (i.e., execution and verification times) also suggest the potential for our protocol to be deployed in a real-world mobile network.
Frequent mobility of users in their visiting networks is out of the scope of this work. However, in case (i) when the users belong to different geographical regions, their authentication will be achieved using the process discussed in the EasySMS protocol [16] , and (ii) when the user moves to a visiting network, the authentication is completed by the process mentioned in SAKA [36] , ES-AKA [39] , and IoT-enabled LTE AKA [54] , respectively, in 2G, 3G, and 4G networks. The additional communication overhead in BAS-VAS will include routing transmitted information from the Visiting-AS to the Home-AS. The future direction of this work will include a lightweight implementation of a Homomorphic encryption and further reduction of overall computation and execution time.
APPENDIX FORMAL PROOF
This section presents the formal proof of the proposed protocol using Proverif, an automatic verification tool [55] . We perform five adversary queries: (i) Can an adversary successfully recover confidential information from the messages sent over the network?, (ii) Can an adversary successfully compute parameters generated by the MS?, (iii) Can an adversary successfully compute parameters generated by the AS?, (iv) Can an adversary successfully generate DK key of the MS?, and (v) Can an adversary successfully recover secret key of the MS? The following queries (under settings mentioned below) were made from an attacker point of view to verify whether the proposed protocol is secure:
Query event(endAS(x1_2400,x2_2401)) ==> event (begAS(x1_2400,x2_2401) 
